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THE KEYS TO THE KINGDOM: 
JUDGES, PRE-HEARING PROCEDURE, AND ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 
COLLEEN F. SHANAHAN* 
 Judges see themselves as—and many reforming voices urge them to 
be—facilitators of access to justice for pro se parties in our state civil and 
administrative courts. Judges’ roles in pro se access to justice are 
inextricably linked with procedures and substantive law, yet our 
understanding of this relationship is limited. Do we change the rules, 
judicial behavior, or both to help self-represented parties? We have begun 
to examine this nuanced question in the courtroom, but we have not 
examined it in a potentially more promising context: pre-hearing motions 
made outside the courtroom. Outside the courtroom, judges rule on requests 
such as motions to continue or for telephone appearances that allow parties 
to participate in and access the hearing room. These requests have 
significant consequences for the party, do not implicate the merits of the 
underlying case, and are a pared-down environment in which to examine 
the interaction of judicial behavior and procedures. 
 This article analyzes pre-hearing procedures using more than 5,000 
individual unemployment insurance cases, largely involving self-represented 
litigants, to investigate how judges and procedure interact to expand or 
contract access to the hearing room and thus to justice. The data show 
significant variation in how judges apply these procedures and in parties’ 
case outcomes. These findings underscore the importance of pre-hearing 
procedures and judicial decisions that grant or deny access to the 
courtroom, and the barriers that judicial application of these procedures can 
present for self-represented litigants. The findings also suggest that changes 
to judicial behavior—through suggestion, training, or ethical codes—may be 
insufficient to address this aspect of access to civil justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tens of millions of Americans engage with the civil justice system, 
overwhelmingly in state civil and administrative courts.1 These courts 
are struggling to serve the litigants who seek help through their doors.2 
The core of this challenge is that, despite an adversarial system 
designed around the norm of attorneys representing the parties, state 
civil and administrative litigants overwhelmingly do not have 
representation.3 
 
 1. Recent estimates are that there are about twenty million civil non-domestic 
cases in the state courts each year. PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, SCOTT GRAVES & 
SHELLEY SPACEK MILLER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 16 (2015) [hereinafter NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS]. 
A 2012–13 survey, capturing about 5% of all state civil cases in the country, found that 
64% of these cases were contract matters (of these, 37% were debt collection cases, 
29% were landlord tenant matters, 17% were foreclosures), 16% were small claims, 
9% were other civil agency determinations, 7% were tort matters, and 1% were 
property cases. This data does not count administrative matters. Id. at 16–19. Further, 
research shows that courts see only a fraction of legal needs: one study estimates only 
24% of civil legal problems were ever taken to a lawyer, and only 14% were taken to a 
court. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical 
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51, 56–60 (2010). 
 2. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at iii–vi. 
 3. The most recent research shows that in 76% of non-family law cases in 
state civil court, including contract, tort, and property matters, at least one party does 
not have representation. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at iv, 31–32. 
Research from the larger study of which this article is a part, among others, has shown 
low levels of representation in administrative courts. See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan, 
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In state civil and administrative courts, the hearing—the in-person 
interaction that occurs between self-represented litigants and judges in 
the courtroom—is the focal point of the justice system due to two 
related factors. First, litigants are largely self-represented and thus have 
limited capacity to engage in written pleadings.4 As a result, the only 
way for litigants to actually participate in state civil and administrative 
courts is to come to court in person and talk to the judge. Second, the 
procedural rules and substantive law in state civil and administrative 
courts are crafted to accommodate this limitation and thus provide 
limited opportunities for litigants to engage with state civil courts 
outside the hearing. In the face of self-represented litigants who are 
unlikely to write motions and briefs, courts may change their 
procedures to become more “pro se-friendly” or “simplified” by 
emphasizing in-person interaction in the hearing room. 
This focus on the hearing as the almost exclusive site of justice 
casts judges as the central actors. Thus, the role of judges in the 
courtroom is the natural focus of the limited research and reform that 
has occurred to date.5 Yet, not every litigant gets into the hearing 
room. This is because state civil and administrative courts have written 
procedures, applied by judges, that control access to the hearing room. 
These procedures—such as requests to appear by telephone or for a new 
hearing date—are independent of the merits of the underlying case, and 
happen in writing (with varying degrees of formality). Due to the 
central role of hearings in these cases, these pre-hearing procedures 
functionally allow or end a litigant’s case. 
The judicial gatekeeping role in deciding pre-hearing procedural 
motions is largely unseen. The invisibility of these procedures is a 
consequence of the inconsistency between the assumption of 
representation in our adversarial model and the reality of the civil 
justice system. Self-represented litigants, and some types of 
representatives, rarely challenge a judge’s application of procedure in 
 
Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, 93 DENV. 
L. REV. 469 (2016) [hereinafter Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise]. 
 4. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 31–32, 35. 
 5. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the 
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market 
for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking 
the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004); Jessica K. Steinberg, 
Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 899; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of 
Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro 
Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
423 (2004). 
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the courtroom.6 Without challenges, our legal system does not allow us 
to see what happens in small cases; if there is no objection to overrule 
and from which to appeal, we do not know the problem exists.7 If this 
is true in the hearing room, where the procedure is playing out in plain 
view, it is exacerbated in procedures outside the hearing room. A self-
represented party may submit a form asking for a continuance. That 
request is denied. The case ends. Paired with the lack of research, this 
invisibility means we do not know the scope of state civil and 
administrative court procedures that control access to the hearing room, 
or whether they are transparent, predictable, or fair for millions of 
litigants. 
This article begins to make this part of our justice system visible 
by examining extensive empirical data about one example of pre-
hearing procedures that control access to the hearing room. Using data 
from over 5,000 unemployment insurance cases, the article looks at 
how judges decide motions to continue and motions to appear by 
telephone. The findings reveal significant variation among judges in 
how they decide these motions and thus control access to the hearing 
room for litigants. The data also show that a judge who is more likely 
to decide these motions in favor of access to the hearing room 
correlates with improved case outcomes for litigants. 
Like all empirical studies, the data presented in this article are 
from a particular example—in this case, an administrative court and its 
collection of judges. This particular example is helpful because motions 
to continue and for telephone appearance are common examples of pre-
hearing procedures that exist in thousands of state civil and 
administrative courts around the country. In addition, as discussed in 
more detail below, the data are from a court that is generally friendly to 
self-represented litigants. As a result, the challenges revealed by this 
study are likely to be experienced in more extreme forms in courts with 
fewer resources and less investment in access for self-represented 
litigants. 
Part I of the article discusses the scholarly context for this article. 
Part II describes the site of the study, the data, and the methodology. 
Part III presents the findings. Part IV discusses the implications of these 
findings. 
 
 6. See, e.g., Anna E. Carpenter, Alyx Mark & Colleen F. Shanahan, Trial 
and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer Advocates, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1023 (2017) 
[hereinafter Trial and Error]. 
 7. Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Can a Little 
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1367, 1373 (2016) 
[hereinafter Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?].  
SHANAHAN – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018 11:22 AM 
2018:215 The Keys to the Kingdom 219 
 
I. CONTEXT 
Scholars have only begun to research and understand the 
challenges facing state civil and administrative courts.8 Most of this 
scholarship examines questions of representation, driven by the stark 
difference between the impossibility of a lawyer for each litigant in 
state court and the theoretical norm (and general reality in the federal 
system) of two represented parties in an adversarial system.9 As a 
result, state civil and administrative courts and their lack of resources—
especially representation—have earned them the moniker “poor 
people’s courts.”10 The literature has begun to theorize about the role of 
representation, observe the variation in how state civil courts operate, 
evaluate the role of representation in these systems, and expand 
empirical examination of these questions.11 In addition, there is 
 
 8. Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical 
Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101. See also Can a Little Representation 
Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7; D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does 
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012); Lawyers, 
Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3; Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local 
Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707 (2015); Shannon Portillo, The 
Adversarial Process of Administrative Claims: The Process of Unemployment Insurance 
Hearings, 49 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 257 (2017) (describing a sociological study of the 
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings); Mary Spector & Ann 
Baddour, Collection Texas-Style: An Analysis of Consumer Collection Practices in and 
out of the Courts, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1427 (2016); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side 
Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741 (2015); Trial and Error, 
supra note 6. Two early seminal studies of state courts were HERBERT M. KRITZER, 
LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998) and Barbara Bezdek, 
Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal 
Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).  
 9. Lawyers, Power and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3. See also Richard 
Zorza, We Now Have the Data that Shows that the One-Side-Self-Represented Case is 
the Dominant Case Situation in US Civil State Courts and that We Need a Fundamental 
Rethink of the State Civil Justice System, ACCESS TO J. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/5P3H-B23L]. 
 10. Russell Engler coined the term some years ago, and the recent increase in 
scholarship concerning civil access to justice has resurrected it. Russell Engler, Out of 
Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with 
Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 83 (1997). See, e.g., Elizabeth L. 
MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People's Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 476 (2015); Steinberg, supra note 8. 
 11. As empiricism has grown in legal scholarship, there is an increasing focus 
on research that looks at the civil justice system in the lower courts and in the lives of 
most Americans. One strain of this scholarship labels itself as access to justice 
scholarship. See, e.g., Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8; MacDowell, supra note 10; 
Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of 
Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 456–58 (2011). 
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increasing awareness of the complementary and prevalent role of 
administrative courts along with state civil courts in our legal system.12 
The overwhelming conclusion of existing research is that these 
courts are not working. They are not working for litigants looking for 
effective problem solving mechanisms,13 for an experience of justice or 
satisfaction in their interactions with the system,14 or for avoiding 
negative social or economic consequences from legal problems.15 This 
is especially true for less-resourced litigants in cases with asymmetrical 
power relationships.16 The courts are not working for low or no cost 
legal service providers who are overwhelmed by demand and under 
resourced.17 They are not working for court systems, either from a 
 
Other voices come from new legal realism. See e.g., Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth, 
Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse & David Wilkins, Is it Time for a New 
Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 337; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, 
Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal 
Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79 (2009). The scholarly literature is complemented 
by efforts of state court actors to understand the realities and potential in the existing 
system. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL 
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2017); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 
1. 
 12. Judith Resnik, Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions, 143 
DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 9 (2014). See also Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica 
K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 
2018 WIS. L. REV. 249. 
 13. Jonathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in 
Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483, 485–87, 499–500 (1988); William M. 
O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small 
Claims Court Narratives, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 661, 661–62, 666–67 (1985). 
 14. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the 
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC'Y REV. 
645 (2008); E. Allan Lind, et. al, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ 
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
953 (1990); William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil 
Justice System, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 137 (1988); Victor D. Quintanilla, Taboo 
Procedural Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public Experiences Tradeoffs Between 
Procedural Justice and Cost, 15 NEV. L.J. 882 (2015); Tom R. Tyler, Justice and 
Power in Civil Dispute Processing, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 
(Bryant G. Garth, Austin Sarat eds., 1998) (providing overview of empirical studies 
about litigant satisfaction, viewed subjectively); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & 
SOC'Y REV. 103 (1988); Nourit Zimerman & Tom. R. Tyler, Between Access to 
Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
473 (2010) (party participation leads to voluntary compliance with governmental 
decisions). 
 15. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 11, at 7 (seven in ten low-income 
Americans report that a legal problem has significantly affected their lives).  
 16. Lawyers, Power, & Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 484–89. 
 17. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 11, at 37–45. 
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system design perspective or as an exercise in public spending. In the 
face of the reality that lawyers cannot assist litigants as the adversarial 
system presumes, scholars and advocates have begun to develop new 
norms and designs for state civil and administrative justice systems. 
One strain of this scholarship casts judges as key actors in facilitating 
access to justice in state civil courts.18 
Federal civil judges have long captured the attention of the 
scholarly community, and this literature is far more developed than 
research about state civil or administrative judges.19 This research has 
largely focused on the role of judges inside the courtroom, or in 
deciding dispositive pretrial motions such as motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment.20 The scholars who have considered judges as 
procedural gatekeepers outside the courtroom have almost exclusively 
 
 18. Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010); Engler, supra note 5; Pearce, supra note 5; Steinberg, 
supra note 8. In addition to the judge-focused thinking discussed in this article, there 
are other approaches such as those focusing on clerk and self-help centers. Deborah L. 
Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 899–901 
(2009); Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to 
Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
45, 60–61 (2012) (noting self-help reforms and court simplification efforts “have 
become significant features of the access-to-justice landscape in their own right”). 
Another strain of this literature focuses on technology and design, driven in part by the 
role of technology in current society and perhaps also by commercial interests in 
technological solutions. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING 
JUSTICE: MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW (2017); 
Margaret Hagan, The User Experience of the Internet as a Legal Help Service: Defining 
Standards for the Next Generation of User-Friendly Online Legal Services, 20 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 394 (2016). 
 19. This is unsurprising. We write what we know and lots of us know federal 
courts and federal judges. In addition, access to empirical data is far easier in the 
federal courts. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE 65–85 (2013) (discussing political affiliation and judicial decision making); 
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the 
Assumption that Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21, 25 
(1931); Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having 
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 38 
(2015) (discussing gender of judge’s children & votes on gender issues); Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow 
the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015); Corey Rayburn Yung, 
A Typology of Judging Styles, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1757 (2013). 
 20. EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 65–85; Frank, supra note 
19, at 21–25; Glynn & Sen, supra note 19, at 38; Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, 
supra note 19; Yung, supra note 19. 
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considered the role of federal judges in discovery in complex 
litigation.21 
At best, this literature is a distant analogy for state civil or 
administrative judges.22 This is because in federal and complex 
litigation, attorney representation for both parties is more consistently 
present.23 This representation shapes (and checks) judicial behavior in 
ways that define the judicial role. In addition, federal procedure—
resting on the assumption of attorney representation—provides for 
meaningful process outside the courtroom.24 A simple example 
illustrates the difference: in federal court, a lawyer may request a 
rescheduled hearing date because the party has a medical condition. 
Even if that request is denied, the party has not lost her chance to 
pursue her case. Rather, the attorney would go without the party, or the 
attorney would file a motion for summary judgment that resolves the 
case, or any other collection of procedural adjustments. A default 
ruling against the party would be highly unusual. Without this 
representation or procedure in state civil courts, both the context and 
the judicial role are different: if the request for continuance is denied, 
the party is without recourse in practice and her case would end. 
As my co-authors and I explain in more detail in Studying the 
“New” Civil Judges, there is a glaring need for research about state 
civil and administrative courts and judges.25 It is unsurprising that the 
limited research that does exist examines the role of judges in the 
 
 21. E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1247–50 (2005); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural 
Checks on Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995); 
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378–80 (1982). But see Paul 
R.J. Connolly, Why We Do Need Managerial Judges, JUDGES’ J., Fall 1984, at 34 
(arguing in favor of managerial judging). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the rise of 
public law litigation in the federal courts and the role of judges in this context). 
 22. It is worth noting that even in complex federal litigation, the managerial 
judge has been criticized, criticism that is magnified in the state civil court context. See, 
e.g., 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 55 
(1990) (criticizing arbitrariness of judicial discretion in “managerial” decisions).  
 23. Federal courts are not completely immune to the challenges of self-
represented litigants, as reflected in Judge Posner’s recent attention to how self-
represented litigants are treated in federal appeals (which are largely appeals from 
administrative matters). See Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, 
Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), [https://perma.cc/G6LH-LZUQ]. 
 24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16; Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial 
in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 395 (2003).  
 25. Carpenter, Steinberg, Shanahan & Mark, supra note 12. 
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hearing room—what is the judge doing, how, why, and could the judge 
behave differently so that the civil justice system operates more 
effectively?26 The handful of studies that have considered judicial 
behavior outside the hearing room have done so in circumstances that 
are not squarely in state administrative or civil courts.27 
This article uses as its foundation the research we do have about 
state civil and administrative courts and the role of judges, and the 
limited analogy of research about federal judges. With this foundation, 
the article makes visible the decision-making of judges in pre-hearing 
procedural requests. Without the layers of interpersonal interaction that 
occur in the hearing room, this is a low “noise” way to consider 
questions of judicial decision-making.28 The article addresses a narrow 
set of questions about these pre-hearing procedures, and this analysis 
provides insight into larger questions of access to justice in state civil 
and administrative courts. 
 
 26. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT 
MANAGERS 54 (1998); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and 
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 
(1992) (empirical study of a Baltimore housing court); Anna E. Carpenter, Active 
Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2017) [hereinafter Active 
Judging and Access to Justice] (developing theories of judicial behavior in the 
administrative hearing room that underpin “active judging”); Michele Cotton, A Case 
Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It, 16 J.L. SOC’Y 61 (2014) (study 
examining the experiences of unrepresented tenants in a landlord/tenant court); Jessica 
K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem-
Solving Housing Court, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1058 (2017); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 
788 (discussing “dismantling barriers put in place by procedural and evidentiary rules” 
and “narrow conceptions of the judicial role”); id. at 747 (a reformed system is one 
where “disclosure of key documents is automatic, the rules of evidence emphasize 
weight rather than admissibility, and judges assume an active role in identifying legal 
theories and drawing out relevant testimony”). 
 27. See John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of 
Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 
N.C. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (1988); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372–73 (2007) (discussing 
immigration adjudication in federal setting).  
 28. Robert P. Burns, The Rule of Law in the Trial Court, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 
307, 319–20 (2007) (suggesting that legal rules may be applied more accurately in 
motions than in trials, in part because exposure to extraneous factors is less likely); 
Morton Denlow, Justice Should Emphasize People, Not Paper, 83 JUDICATURE 50, 50 
(1999) (arguing that the lack of face-to-face interaction among parties, judges, and 
lawyers is detrimental to the federal justice system); Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, 
supra note 19, at 899 (demonstrating “that affect influences law interpretation and 
application and that it does so even in the relatively emotionally arid (compared to trial) 
setting of pretrial motions”). 
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Like all empirical studies, the data in this article describe only the 
court and the cases being studied. Yet the characteristics of this study 
site are not unusual. State courts are the courts closest to the people and 
they hear the largest number of cases in the country. Administrative 
courts are increasingly formal and central to people’s lives.29 
Administrative courts exist in every jurisdiction, with significant case 
volume and limited representation, and handle issues such as housing 
disputes, Social Security, Medicare, unemployment and other benefits, 
school discipline, and family law issues.30 Though there is variation of 
all kinds at the state and local levels, there are also shared 
characteristics, including the hearing as the centerpiece of the process 
and limited discovery or merits consideration outside the hearing 
room.31 
A. Data and Site of the Study 
This article draws on data including more than 5,000 individual 
unemployment insurance cases with information on every part of the 
case.32 The data capture the entirety of the court’s docket—all of the 
cases that were filed—for two and a half years. The data also include 
qualitative interviews with representatives and judges who try and hear 
these cases.33 The study is informed by the author and co-investigator’s 
experiences representing clients in these cases.34 
 
 29. Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in 
Assisting the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 455–56 
(2007); Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as Bridge Between Law and 
Culture, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 9–12, 18 (2003) (describing Social 
Security administrative law judges behaving like civil trial judges and noting, “[i]n 
many agencies today, administrative litigation is virtually indistinguishable from civil 
litigation”).  
 30. Bernard, supra note 29, at 25–28.  
 31. See Baldacci, supra note 29, at 455–56, 486. 
 32. To collect the quantitative data, my co-researchers, research assistants, 
and I engaged in a three-step process. First, we obtained data from Office of 
Administrative Hearings’ case management system. Second, we supplemented and 
verified this data through review of each paper case file, conducted according to a 
comprehensive collection protocol. Third, we performed supplemental two-tier data 
checks of the paper case files and reviewed the collected data for both internal 
consistency and consistency with court procedures. The collected data were then coded 
according to a comprehensive coding plan to allow for the use of statistical software for 
analysis. 
 33. The qualitative data are presented in this article only when relevant to the 
quantitative analysis. For more on the qualitative data, see Colleen F. Shanahan, 
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These cases are unemployment insurance appeals in the District of 
Columbia’s central administrative court, the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH). OAH is an independent organization, which began 
formal operation in 2004 to improve hearings arising from District 
agencies.35 Unemployment insurance appeals, the focus of our data, are 
one of about a dozen types of cases heard at OAH.36 Appointed 
administrative law judges (ALJs) hear these cases, to which they are 
randomly assigned.37 
On one side of an unemployment insurance appeal is a worker who 
has been separated from her job and is seeking unemployment benefits. 
On the other side of the appeal is the worker’s former employer, whose 
incentive to contest benefits is a tax rate that corresponds to the number 
of former workers who have received unemployment benefits.38 
Employers include a wide range of small and large corporations and 
government agencies. Workers in these cases disproportionately held 
low-wage jobs.39 
Though the opposing parties are the worker and employer, this is 
an administrative proceeding that arises from the Department of 
Employment Services’ decision about the worker’s qualification for 
benefits. As a result, these cases do not have the typical settlement rate 
of other “small” civil cases. To the contrary, an employer does not 
 
Jeffrey Selbin, Alyx Mark & Anna E. Carpenter, Measuring Law School Clinics, 92 
TUL. L. REV. 547 (2018); Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26; Trial 
and Error, supra note 6.  
 34. We did not formally collect data by observing hearings, though the 
combination of my five years and Professor Carpenter’s two years of experience 
supervising student representation in the same clinic exposed us to hundreds of these 
cases between 2010 and 2015.  
 35. About OAH, OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/BR2R-
CL8Y]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ALJs are appointed by the Commission on Selection and Tenure (COST), 
ultimately for six-year terms. See D.C. CODE § 2-1831.08(c) (2017). COST consists of 
one member appointed by the Mayor, one member appointed by the Chairman of the 
D.C. Council, one member appointed by the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia, and two non-voting members appointed by the Office of the 
Attorney General and the Chief ALJ. Id. § 2-1831.07(a). The ALJs come from a range 
of professional and personal backgrounds. ALJ Biographies, OFFICE OF ADMIN. 
HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/9RJZ-QCMF]. 
 38. D.C. CODE § 51-103 (2015). 
 39. See AUSTIN NICHOLS & MARGARET SIMMS, URBAN INST., RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS DURING THE 
GREAT RECESSION (2012), [https://perma.cc/G9BQ-69DZ]; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0701147, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: LOW-WAGE 
AND PART-TIME WORKERS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE LOW RATES OF RECEIPT (2007), 
[https://perma.cc/CBC7-SXE8].  
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have the ability to settle a case because the employer does not control 
the award of benefits; rather, the employer only contests the facts 
regarding separation from employment. 
B. Centrality of the Hearing 
These cases are good opportunities to observe how judges 
implement pre-hearing procedures because the hearing is the 
substantive centerpiece of the litigation. There is a strong emphasis of a 
resolution on the merits in the hearing room. Consistent with due 
process principles, the procedural rules at OAH accommodate self-
represented parties with limited capacity for substantive motions 
practice outside the hearing room.40 Unemployment insurance appeals 
at OAH are de novo hearings, where the underlying agency 
determination has no legal weight and the agency record (other than the 
agency determination letter) is not introduced into evidence or even 
made available to the parties. Discovery procedures are limited, and 
rarely used, save for a rule that requires the parties to share exhibits 
and witnesses three days before the hearing.41 In addition, the employer 
in these hearings bears the burdens of production and of proof. In 
practice, this means that if an employer does not appear at their hearing 
and the worker appears, the worker wins. Thus, pre-hearing requests 
are particularly important because these requests are necessarily about 
participating at all in one’s case. 
Further, in the District of Columbia, there is explicit appellate 
authority for a “‘strong judicial and societal preference’ for the 
resolution of disputes on their merits rather than by default,”42 a 
preference that necessarily requires activity in the hearing room due to 
the procedural rules in these cases. Appellate law further provides that 
“resort to technicalities to foreclose recourse to . . . judicial processes 
is ‘particularly inappropriate’” in unemployment and other statutory 
 
 40. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970) (“[t]he opportunity 
to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be 
heard.”). 
 41. D.C. OAH Rule 2985.1 (2016). In practice, a failure to disclose does not 
always prevent use of this evidence. Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 
26, at 678, 687–88. 
 42. Moore Energy Res., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 785 A.2d 300, 305 
(D.C. 2001) (quoting Abell v. Wang, 697 A.2d 796, 800 (D.C. 1997)). 
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schemes “in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the 
process.”43 
Proceedings at OAH look and feel similar to a court of general 
jurisdiction, in contrast to administrative proceedings in some other 
contexts.44 Judges hear cases in formal hearing rooms with a dais, 
witness box, gallery, and audio equipment. The judges wear robes, 
have gavels, and the parties sit at separate “counsel” tables. The 
process of these hearings is also formal, including objections, motions, 
and introducing documents. Every case results in a written decision. 
Our earlier articles have explored how procedures play an important 
role in these cases, and that self-represented parties are less likely to 
use procedures than represented parties.45 
A majority of parties in the data have no representation, and 
workers are more likely to be unrepresented. Neither party has 
representation in forty-nine percent of these cases, with workers going 
without representation in eighty-two percent of cases and unrepresented 
employers in fifty-eight percent of cases.46 In almost ninety percent of 
the cases in the data, at least one party does not have representation.47 
OAH has a variety of legal representation for those who are 
represented. Most represented workers are served by law school 
clinics, the pro bono Claimant Advocacy Program, or the Legal Aid 
Society of D.C.48 Represented employers are served by nonlawyers 
working with human resources companies, in-house counsel, private 
attorneys, or the pro bono Employer Advocacy Program.49 
 
 43. Barnett v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C. 1985) 
(quoting Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Id. (quoting Love v. 
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)). 
 44. See Nina Schuyler, The Challenges and Rewards of an Administrative Law 
Judge, S.F. ATT'Y, Spring 2010, at 39, 40–41. Unemployment appeal hearings in some 
states are held by telephone or in meeting rooms. See, e.g., MICH. UNEMP’T INS. 
AGENCY, A GUIDE TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS HEARING 7, 11–13, 15, 
[https://perma.cc/J4S4-B3Q8] (discussing hearings being held either in person in a 
hearing room or by telephone). 
 45. Can a Little Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7, at 
1375–76; Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 470. 
 46. Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1032. 
 47. Shanahan, Selbin, Mark & Carpenter, supra note 33, at 17.  
 48. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 476; Shanahan, 
Selbin, Mark & Carpenter, supra note 33, at 18. 
 49. Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1032–33. 
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C. The District of Columbia: A Pro Se-Friendly Jurisdiction 
The District of Columbia is a relatively pro se-friendly 
jurisdiction. The potential contrast with other jurisdictions makes the 
data particularly important: if this is the experience of parties in a pro 
se-friendly jurisdiction, what is the experience of unrepresented parties 
in less friendly jurisdictions? Any findings from this data that suggest 
restricted or difficult access to the hearing room are the “better” 
version of this access to justice challenge. It is a reasonable hypothesis 
that these problems are worse elsewhere. 
The pro se-friendliness of the District of Columbia arises in the 
data in several ways. First, data collection for this study occurred just 
after the District of Columbia completed an effort to examine the role 
of judges in facilitating pro se access. This effort resulted in an 
expansion—as captured in both formal rules of conduct and informal 
training and guidance—of the understanding of how judges could assist 
self-represented parties in hearings.50 
Second, even before this effort in the District of Columbia, OAH 
had formal rules and informal practices that accommodated self-
represented parties. This is in part a reflection of the nature of 
administrative law, with its more flexible rules of evidence and 
standards of review. It is also in part a reflection of the relatively 
unusual phenomenon in the District of Columbia of a centralized, 
professionalized court to hear administrative cases. It is also a 
consequence of the D.C. Court of Appeals’ active role in requiring pro 
se friendliness in administrative matters, and the effect of this appellate 
activity on the judges at OAH.51 
Third, the substantive law governing unemployment insurance 
appeals is claimant (worker) friendly, and workers are the more likely 
pro se, and typically less-resourced party.52 Federal and District law 
clearly establishes “[u]nemployment benefits ‘are a matter of statutory 
 
 50. For a summary of D.C. court reform, see District of Columbia Courts, 
DC ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/2PF6-VB2N]. See Active Judging 
and Access to Justice, supra note 26. 
 51. Prime v. D.C. Dep’t. of Pub. Works, 955 A.2d 178, 185 (2008). The 
court stated: 
We have repeatedly held, in applying statutory regimens in which litigants 
ordinarily represent themselves, that a measure of leniency is appropriate 
with respect to procedural or other similar errors or miscues, that the 
contentions of the pro se litigants are to be generously construed, and that 
waivers of substantive claims or defenses are not to be lightly inferred.  
See also Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26. 
 52. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3. 
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entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.’”53 The D.C. Court 
of Appeals has actively enforced its holding that the unemployment 
compensation statute “should be construed liberally, whenever 
appropriate to accomplish the legislative objective of minimizing the 
economic burden of unemployment.”54 As a result of this overlap of 
substantive law, procedures, and judicial conduct reform, the data in 
this article capture a pro se-friendly version of how pre-hearing 
procedures control access to the hearing room. 
D. Pre-Hearing Procedures 
In unemployment insurance appeals at OAH, parties can make pre-
hearing and post-hearing requests.55 These requests must be in writing, 
but the court accepts almost any form of writing, so the submissions 
range from formal motions written by lawyers to handwritten letters 
from workers. If a party attempts to make a request by telephone or in 
person, the clerk tells the person to submit the request in writing by 
mail, fax, email, or in person. The court’s website has simple forms for 
basic requests.56 OAH has a resource center directly next to the clerk’s 
desk where parties can get assistance completing these forms or 
otherwise submitting written requests. 
This article examines the two most common pre-hearing 
procedural requests: requests to appear by telephone and requests for a 
different hearing date. When judges consider these pre-hearing 
requests, they typically have only the request to consider. There are no 
discovery motions, pretrial merits motions, pretrial hearings, settlement 
conferences, or any other information or interaction that can form an 
impression about the case like there is in federal or complex civil 
litigation. In this data, the judge has little to no information about the 
substantive claims in the case when considering the pre-hearing 
procedural requests. The judge can see the caption in the case, which 
indicates whether it is the worker or employer who has filed the appeal, 
 
 53. Hawkins v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 381 A.2d 619, 623 (D.C. 
1977); see D.C. CODE § 51-110(a) (2015). 
 54. Bublis v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 575 A.2d 301, 303 (D.C. 1990). 
 55. Though this article focuses on pre-hearing requests, there are also post-
hearing requests such as a motion for new hearing or motion for reconsideration that 
ask a judge either to schedule a new hearing when the party has missed a court date or 
to change her decision based on new evidence. Because the written law of post-hearing 
requests combines both procedural access and the merits of the underlying case, these 
requests are not part of this article’s analysis. 
 56. OAH Forms, OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/EUJ9-
62QP]. 
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and thus who lost the agency determination. Though it is not evidence 
in the case or legally binding in any way, the judge may be able to 
access a paper case file with a one-page agency determination letter that 
typically has a few sentences about the reason for a decision. However, 
our qualitative research shows that it is rare for a judge to have the case 
file far enough in advance of a hearing to have read it while considering 
a pre-hearing request.57 
Specific OAH rules and practices, as well as appellate law, govern 
these requests. Telephone appearances are explicitly provided for in 
OAH’s procedural rules and are permitted “for good cause shown” and 
“will ordinarily be granted where the witness does not reside [in the 
area].”58 There is not a specific OAH Rule governing rescheduled 
hearing dates in unemployment insurance cases.59 As a matter of 
practice, a “good cause” standard is also applied to these requests. The 
standard appears routinely in the written decisions in these cases when 
reciting a procedural history where a continuance was granted.60 In 
addition, written decisions where one party does not appear note the 
absence of a continuance or telephone request in explaining why the 
court proceeded in the party’s absence.61 
The D.C. Court of Appeals, while not directly addressing pre-
hearing continuance or telephone requests in unemployment cases, has 
considered pre-hearing continuances in other administrative matters and 
 
 57. This understanding is based on qualitative interviews with judges and 
representatives that were part of the broader study. It is consistent with the author’s 
experience directing a clinic that represented hundreds of workers in these cases. See 
Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26. 
 58. D.C. OAH Rule 2821.8 (2016). Telephone appearances may be the one 
area where D.C. is less pro se-friendly than other states: in many states, unemployment 
compensation hearings are exclusively telephone hearings. Andrew Grosjean, 
Preparing for an Unemployment Hearing or Telephone Conference, TOUGHNICKEL 
(Aug. 17, 2016), [https://perma.cc/J4YL-SV9K] (stating that “most [u]nemployment 
hearings are done by phone”). 
 59. There is a “good cause” standard for other specific types of cases. There 
is a specific rule allowing for extension of time to file an initial unemployment appeal 
for “excusable neglect or good cause.” D.C. OAH Rule 2981.1 (2016). There are also 
specific rules for school discipline and failure to attend a public benefits hearing. D.C. 
OAH Rule 2902.8 (2016) (school discipline); D.C. OAH Rule 2976.2 (2016) (failure to 
attend public benefits hearing).  
 60. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. Employer, No. 2010 DCOAH 00446, 2010 WL 
2168924, at *1 (D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings March 23, 2010) (“On March 15, 
2010, for good cause shown, I granted Employer’s request for a continuance and 
rescheduled the hearing . . .”).  
 61. See, e.g., U.H.C. v. K.W., No. 2007 DCOAH 109180, 2008 WL 
2953173, at *1 n.1 (D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 30, 2008) (“Claimant failed 
to appear for the January 25, 2008 hearing. . . . Claimant did not file a request for 
continuance or otherwise explain an inability to appear for the hearing.”). 
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taken a generous stance despite the high abuse of discretion standard to 
which administrative agencies are held.62 On appellate review, the court 
considers “the reasons for the request for continuance, the prejudice 
that would result from its denial, the parties[’] diligence in seeking 
relief, any lack of good faith, and any prejudice to the opposing 
party.”63 In addition, the Court of Appeals applied a “good cause” 
standard to an unemployment case where the continuance request was 
made at the hearing itself.64 
Taken as a whole, the formal law and practices that are the context 
for the data in this article are such that pre-hearing motions to continue 
and for telephone appearances can be considered similar requests for 
access to the hearing room, using a similar legal standard, in a legal 
regime where the hearing room is the centerpiece, and the law both 
allows for and, in some ways, encourages judges to grant such requests 
for access. 
1. MATERIALS FOR LITIGANTS 
 In addition to formal procedures, OAH provides materials to the 
public about continuances and telephone hearings.65 Each party receives 
a scheduling order that includes a hearing date, information about pro 
bono attorney services, and information about continuances and 
telephone hearings. The scheduling order provides this information 
regarding telephone hearings (which is then followed by instructions 
about filing the request and service on the other party): “Participation 
by Telephone: You may ask to participate by telephone, if you have a 
good reason. You may also ask that a witness participate by telephone, 
if there is a good reason.”66 
 
 62. “The denial of a continuance will be reversed when a continuance is 
needed ‘to avoid “material hardship and injustice.”’” Murphy v. A.A. Beiro Constr. 
Co., 679 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Feaster v. Feaster, 359 
A.2d 272, 273 (D.C. 1976) (quoting Etty v. Middleton, 62 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C. 
1948)); see also PUB. ADMIN. LAW & PROCEDURE § 137 (73A CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM 1983) (“[T]he refusal by an administrative agency to grant a continuance of 
a hearing clearly required by the ends of justice is an abuse of discretion.”). 
 63. A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 679 A.2d at 1043. 
 64. Nursing Unlimited Servs., Inc. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 974 A.2d 
218, 220 (D.C. 2009). 
 65. As with many courts, these publicly available materials and orders evolve 
regularly. The materials described here were available during the time period captured 
by the data in this article. 
 66. D.C. Office of Admin. Hearings, Scheduling Order for an In-Person 
Hearing, at 2 (on file with author). 
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 It provides this information regarding a new hearing date: 
“Changing Hearing Date or Time: We discourage this because we want 
to resolve your case quickly. If you have a good reason for making 
such a request, you must first try to contact the other party and see if 
they will agree.”67 
In addition, OAH provides standardized request forms on its 
website and at the resource center. The Telephone Form states, “[y]ou 
or your witness may participate by telephone at your hearing . . . if you 
have a good reason. You must try to get the other party to agree.”68 
The Different Hearing Date Form states “[y]ou may ask for a different 
hearing date or time if you have an emergency or another good reason. 
You must try to get the other party to agree.”69  
OAH also publishes (online and at the resource center) two “What 
to Expect at a Hearing” booklets: a general one and an unemployment 
insurance specific one. The unemployment insurance booklet says that 
parties “may submit evidence to OAH in the form of in person or 
telephonic sworn testimony by themselves or other witnesses and/or 
documents or other exhibits” but includes no instructions or standards 
for telephone hearings or continuances.70 The general booklet has 
language that sets a high bar for these requests.71 Regarding telephone 
hearings, the booklet states: 
In rare circumstances you may file a written Motion to 
Appear by Telephone at your hearing. OAH generally doesn’t 
allow telephone hearings because it puts the person on the 
telephone (and the parties and judge in the courtroom) at a 
disadvantage. You must show that coming to the hearing in 
person is a true hardship in order to be allowed to appear by 
phone.72 
Regarding continuances, the booklet states: 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. General-Request to Participate by Telephone – English, OFFICE OF 
ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/D556-YKT8].  
 69. General-Request for a Different Hearing Date – English, OFFICE OF 
ADMIN. HEARINGS, [https://perma.cc/2BG9-XFJT].  
 70. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, WHAT TO EXPECT AT AN UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE HEARING, [https://perma.cc/NA88-U5N3].  
 71. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, WHAT TO EXPECT AT A HEARING 5–6, 
[https://perma.cc/X2LE-CGJ5].  
 72. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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You must attend the hearing in person. If you don’t, you 
could lose your case. In rare circumstances, such as scheduled 
surgery or a hearing in another court, you can request a new 
hearing by filing a written Motion for a Continuance. You 
must ask for a continuance as soon as you know about the 
conflict. OAH won’t normally postpone a hearing for 
personal reasons or business appointments. Judges also 
usually won’t accept last minute Motions for Continuance, 
unless you have an unforeseen, serious conflict outside of 
your control, such as a medical emergency.73 
These materials for litigants are interpretations (and perhaps 
modifications) of the formal procedures and appellate law in the 
District, and in some ways are inconsistent among themselves. The data 
in this article do not provide the ability to separate the formal law from 
the informal information provided to litigants. What can be said is that 
litigants are making these pre-hearing requests in the face of informal 
information that is at least as stringent as the formal law.74 
E. Methodology 
The quantitative analysis in this article begins with the hypothesis 
that there is variation among judges in how frequently they grant 
continuances or telephone hearings. After observing variation in each 
kind of request, I hypothesize that this variation might matter in some 
way to the rest of litigants’ case experiences. 
To explore this hypothesis, I develop the theory of access-
friendliness. Access-friendliness observes a judge’s likelihood of 
granting each type of pre-hearing request. It captures the collection of 
individual preferences and exercises of discretion in applying the law 
that result in a judge’s decisions, so that this characteristic can be 
observed relative to other data about these cases.75 A judicial access-
friendliness scale captures this variation as a characteristic of the 
particular judge. The scale uses the two types of requests (telephone 
hearing and continuance) to best avoid correlation issues between 
outcome-based motions, process-based motions, and unobservable 
 
 73. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).  
 74. See Richard H. Frankel & Alistair E. Newbern, Prisoners and Pleading, 
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 899 (2017) (measuring how form complaints for federal prisoner 
actions impose burdens inconsistent with governing law). 
 75. This article observes the characteristic of access-friendliness, but does not 
have the data to analyze why a particular judge is access-friendly. This is plainly an 
area for future research. 
SHANAHAN – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018 11:22 AM 
234 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
characteristics of a case or party and to account for sample size 
constraints.76 The scale is fairly reliable with an alpha score of .45. A 
similar scale captures party-specific access-friendliness, that is, a 
judge’s likelihood of granting a particular party type’s pre-hearing 
telephone or continuance request. This scale is also reliable with an 
alpha score of .65. 
Returning to the hypothesis, if access-friendliness is a meaningful 
judicial phenomenon, the expectation is that this variation matters in 
some way. The scale forms the basis for a model that investigates the 
relationship between access-friendliness as an independent variable and 
case outcomes as a dependent variable. The model uses logistic 
regression and controls for the presence of representation and the 
party’s status as appellant. The findings below report odds ratios for 
ease of interpretation. 
This study is observational in nature. It does not use randomized 
design due to the nature of the data and the ethical challenges of 
randomizing cases and their characteristics. It is careful not to call 
results “causal” and instead demonstrates correlative relationships. This 
design acknowledges the unknown selection bias that may occur in a 
party’s choice to appeal an unemployment insurance case or seek and 
obtain representation. The analysis is nonetheless useful because it is a 
very large, population-sized collection of data (every unemployment 
case in the District of Columbia over a two-and-a-half-year period 
where the worker’s separation from employment is at issue) that 
provides insight into a breadth of issues of concern. This type of 
observational study provides useful analysis that a randomized study, 
necessarily focused on narrow variables, cannot. It is also worth noting 
that the analysis in this particular article is primarily concerned with 
judges and not the relative experiences of represented parties as 
compared to unrepresented parties. To that end, representation is 
captured in the descriptive statistics and functions largely as a control 
variable in the analysis. 
III. FINDINGS 
Two main questions guide this inquiry into judges as procedural 
gatekeepers to the hearing room. The first is whether some judges are 
more access-friendly than others. That is, is there variation among 
judges in the granting of procedural requests for a new hearing date or 
 
 76. As a result, some motions that arguably relate to access to a courtroom 
(for example, a motion for a new hearing after the scheduled hearing date) are not 
included here. 
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to appear by telephone? The second is, if there is a range of access-
friendliness among judges, does having an access-friendlier judge 
reveal something about the rest of a litigant’s case experience? 
Specifically, does having a more access-friendly judge correlate with 
better case outcomes for a litigant? 
A. Judicial Variation in Access-Friendliness 
First, the data show significant variation in how judges apply pre-
hearing procedures. Overall, judges grant from 66% to 100% of these 
pre-hearing requests: an average of 80% of telephone hearing requests 
and 85% of continuance requests.77 Chart 1 displays this variation in 
the frequency with which judges grant these requests. 
 There is a dearth of data about how often procedural requests are 
granted in any context, so it is hard to know whether this range of 
variation is consistent with other jurisdictions or case types.78 Even in 
 
 77. There is a low incidence of repeated requests from the same party in the 
data: 13 of 419 telephone hearing requests and 51 of 660 continuance requests are 
subsequent requests (by either party) in the same case. 
 78. Variation in judicial decision-making has largely been measured in the 
context of ultimate case outcomes. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27. One 
recent study of pretrial decisions in the administrative context is similarly tied to the 
underlying merits of the case, as it considers pretrial bond decisions. Emily Ryo, 
Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2016). 
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the absence of comparisons, given the low levels of representation in 
this data, the variation may suggest a previously unmeasured barrier for 
self-represented litigants in civil access to justice. One way to describe 
this variation is from the perspective of judges’ roles in access to 
justice: particular judges are more or less “access-friendly” in applying 
the same non-merits based pre-hearing procedures in the same cases. 
For litigants, this means a judge assignment represents more or less 
access to the hearing room. 
While there is variation among judges, it is confined to a relatively 
high rate of granting these procedural requests. The context of pre-
hearing requests generally, and this study, in particular, suggest this 
variation is nonetheless meaningful. As discussed above, these cases are 
ones where there is both a presumption of a worker receiving 
unemployment compensation and law encouraging access to a hearing. 
It is also useful to remember that these procedural requests do not 
implicate—or even give judges information about—the merits of the 
underlying case. Rather, the requests solely concern the reason for the 
procedural request, such as conflicting medical, family, or professional 
circumstances. Against this backdrop, it is notable that some judges 
deny the request of one in five litigants to appear by telephone or to 
change a hearing date. 
As described in the methodology section, a judicial access-
friendliness scale describes a judge’s propensity towards granting pre-
hearing requests. Each judge’s value on this scale captures his or her 
access-friendliness, providing a tool for observing how this variation 
plays out in other data about these cases. Chart 2 illustrates this scale. 
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The scale captures only the variation in grant rates of pre-hearing 
requests, and does not take into account the party requesting the 
procedural motion or if they are represented.  
Is this observed variation in access-friendliness just party-
friendliness? When a particular judge is more likely to grant a pre-
hearing request, is that only because she favors letting workers (as 
opposed to employers) have their day in court? This additional layer of 
analysis gives insight into whether a judge’s access-friendliness is about 
fidelity to procedural rules, or whether it is a party-specific orientation. 
The scale in Chart 3 captures the difference between judges’ 
amenability toward worker and employer motion requests. Positive 
values of this difference scale indicate that a judge is more favorable 
towards workers’ requests than to employers’ requests.  
Chart 3 shows a different distribution among judges than the 
general access-friendliness scale. A particular judge who is overall 
access-friendly (grants more pre-hearing procedural requests as shown 
in Chart 2) does not do so in a way that proportionally favors either the 
worker or the employer (as shown in Chart 3). This suggests that the 
observed access-friendliness is not masking friendliness toward one 
party over another. 
This variation among judges’ rulings on pre-hearing requests tells 
us that, even in the context of straightforward procedural requests, 
judges do not apply these rules in the same way. It does not tell us what 
inputs the judges are using to make these varying decisions. What we 
do know is that the law as written does not make the merits or 
substance of a party’s case or defense relevant to these pre-hearing 
requests. Nonetheless, one possibility is that some judges are importing 
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the perceived merits of a case or defense into these procedural rulings. 
This would be consistent with psychological research observing judges’ 
difficulties in disregarding inadmissible information in decision-
making.79 If this is an input causing the variation in pre-hearing request 
rulings, then it suggests that access-friendliness overlaps with another 
characteristic: fidelity to written procedure. In this data, following the 
written law of pre-hearing procedural requests and granting requests for 
“good cause” means not considering the substantive merits of the case. 
A finding that judges are not following this written law has implications 
for state civil and administrative courts generally. This is because when 
parties are unrepresented and the traditional protections of the 
represented adversarial process are not available to the parties, judicial 
fidelity to written procedure—that is designed to facilitate access to the 
hearing room—becomes a disproportionately important procedural 
protection. 
Another explanation for the variation in this data is that judges are 
following the law as written and have individual preferences that guide 
decisions on pre-hearing requests. For example, a particular judge 
dislikes telephone appearances and denies all of them, while another 
judge is comfortable with telephone appearances and always grants 
them. It could be that a judge has a very clear standard created from 
her own experience and preferences, such as parties who are outside a 
thirty-mile radius can appear by phone, and applies that standard 
consistently, while another judge has no particular standard and is 
internally inconsistent. This explanation for the observed variation 
raises questions of how much discretion and transparency is necessary 
or appropriate for these informal standards for pre-hearing procedural 
requests. 
B. Judicial Access-Friendliness Is Related to Case Outcomes 
Even without knowing why the observed judicial variation occurs, 
we can ask what the observed access-friendliness means for the rest of 
a litigant’s case experience. Is this variation in access-friendliness only 
a theoretical concern? The data provide an opportunity to explore this 
broader question by asking whether a litigant with a more access-
friendly judge has a different case experience than one with a less 
access-friendly judge. That is, regardless of whether the litigant herself 
has made a pre-hearing procedural request, does a judge who is access-
 
 79. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the 
Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203, 216–18 
(2017) (collecting studies). 
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friendly also behave in certain ways towards litigants generally? In this 
data, the most straightforward way to ask this question is to see if there 
is a correlation between where a judge falls on the access-friendliness 
scale and a litigant’s case outcome. As noted above, the main object of 
this inquiry is judicial behavior and not case outcomes, and also the 
data is observational and thus the analysis is not causal. Nonetheless, 
investigating these correlative relationships is valuable because it helps 
to develop a theoretical understanding of judicial behavior and pre-
hearing procedures in expanding or constraining access to the hearing 
room. 
1. ACCESS, PARTY APPEARANCES, AND CASE OUTCOMES 
This analysis begins with already-reported results from this study: 
that a worker is more likely to win her case than not (in our data, 
workers win 67% of cases).80 As discussed elsewhere, this worker-win 
rate is consistent with other studies and with the substantive legal 
framework of unemployment compensation law.81 This article also 
relies on earlier-reported data regarding appearances: workers appear at 
66% of hearings and employers appear at 53% of hearings.82 
These overall case experiences change when filtered through pre-
trial procedural requests. As Table 4 shows, when a worker has a 
continuance denied she appears at the hearing less (42% compared to 
66% overall) and is less likely to win her case (52% compared to 67% 
overall). In contrast, when an employer has a continuance denied, it is 
more likely to appear at the hearing (58% compared to 53% overall) 
and less likely to win the case (worker wins 79% compared to 67% 
overall). 
There appear to be different variations with telephone appearance 
requests, but the lack of statistical significance for some comparisons 
limits this analysis. When an employer has a telephone appearance 
denied, the employer appears at the hearing more (65% compared to 
53% overall) and wins more (worker wins 58% compared to 67% 
overall). 
  
 
 80. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 482. 
 81. Id. at 481–82. 
 82. Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1035, 1039. 
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Table 4 
Appearances & Outcomes When Procedural Request is Denied 
(case outcomes are reported as rate at which worker wins the case) 
 Overall Worker 
continuance 
denied 
Employer 
continuance 
denied 
Worker 
telephone 
denied 
Employer 
telephone 
denied 
Worker 
appears at 
hearing 
66% 42%  75%**  
Employer 
appears at 
hearing 
53%  58%  65% 
Worker 
wins case 
67% 52% 79% 38%** 58% 
**Insufficient sample size to be significant 
 The differences in appearances and case outcomes after 
procedural requests may be the result of the different nature of 
representation for workers and employers in these cases. Only 19% of 
workers are represented in these cases and these workers are largely 
those in hourly-wage jobs. Thus it may be that when a worker requests 
a continuance, it is because she has an inflexible conflict—such as a 
new job without time off that she does not want to lose. Thus, without a 
continuance, she is likely to forego unemployment compensation and 
keep her new job.83 In contrast, employers are represented in 42% of 
cases in this data, largely by the same small collection of attorney and 
lay representatives.84 Because there is a significant presence of 
sophisticated representatives, and because these representatives often 
have scheduling conflicts among cases, it may be that an employer’s 
continuance request reflects greater flexibility than a worker’s and, 
when a continuance is denied, an alternate representative or witness is 
obtained and the parties appear at the hearing in greater numbers. 
Large employers in this jurisdiction are also repeat players in these 
cases and they may have a clearer understanding that a failure to appear 
at a hearing, even when a continuance is denied, means losing the 
 
 83. If a worker gets a new job she can only claim unemployment 
compensation for the period of time she was unemployed, but because of the lengthy 
claims and appeals process, workers often have hearings at OAH—concerning whether 
they will receive unemployment compensation for interim weeks or months of 
unemployment—long after they have obtained new employment. These are vital 
economic benefits for many workers who are behind on rent or otherwise foregone 
expenses while unemployed and so they still pursue them despite having found new 
employment. 
 84. Trial and Error, supra note 6, at 1032. 
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case.85 In addition, the fact of seeking a continuance may spur an 
employer to focus on preparing a case earlier, leading to a more 
informed choice about contesting the case, and thus a greater inclination 
to appear at the hearing.86 
The decreased win rates for employers whose continuances are 
denied may reflect a combination of the substantive legal burdens in 
these cases and additional notice to workers. If an employer does not 
appear at a hearing and a worker does, the worker automatically wins 
the case due to the employer having the burden of proof. If the denial 
of a continuance means the employer is less likely to attend the hearing, 
this would increase the likelihood of the worker winning the case. In 
addition, when an employer has a continuance denied, this triggers at 
least two additional notices (service of the request and the order 
denying the request) to the worker. This additional notice may increase 
the likelihood the worker attends the hearing, due to additional notice 
and due to the impression that the employer may not attend. 
Though the data is not sufficient to draw meaningful conclusions 
about workers’ telephone requests, employers’ telephone requests are 
more consistent with a straightforward explanation of the behavior of 
the more powerful, more represented party in the face of denied 
requests.87 Table 4 shows that employers whose telephone appearance 
requests are denied are more likely to appear at the hearing than 
employers overall. The fact of a telephone appearance request from an 
employer suggests that the employer has a witness whose testimony it 
wants to present. Thus the increased appearance rate is consistent with 
the explanation that these cases are ones where the party or its 
representative has invested some time in understanding the case, which 
either reflects a choice to contest the case or leads to such a choice 
because solid evidence is located. As Table 4 shows, employers are 
also more likely to win these cases. This is what we would expect— 
having made an informed investment in the case, located evidence, and 
appeared at the hearing, employers win more. 
2. ACCESS-FRIENDLINESS AND CASE OUTCOMES 
The data about party appearances and case outcomes are the 
backdrop for the second part of the inquiry about judicial access-
 
 85. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 491. 
 86. See generally id. 
 87. See, e.g., Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3, at 491 
(discussing theories of how powerful parties develop and exercise expertise in 
navigating procedures). 
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friendliness: what difference does this judicial characteristic make in a 
party’s overall case experience? This next part of the analysis is 
constructed to ask whether the likelihood of a worker winning is 
positively related to a higher placement on the pre-hearing access-
friendliness scale (i.e. a judge who more frequently grants requests for 
a new hearing date or telephone appearance). Though this model asks 
whether a worker wins, this of course inversely relates to whether an 
employer wins. As Table 5 reflects, the model controls for the presence 
of worker representation and the worker’s status as the appellant in the 
case. 
Table 5 reports the outcomes of logistic regression and reports 
odds ratios for ease of interpretation. An odds ratio of less than 1.0 
indicates that the variable is negatively related to worker win rates—the 
odds of a worker winning when those conditions are present are lower 
than if those conditions are not present. Alternatively, an odds ratio 
greater than 1.0 indicates that the presence of a particular variable 
increases the odds of a worker winning her case. 
TABLE 5 
LIKELIHOOD OF WORKER WINNING CASE  
& ACCESS-FRIENDLY JUDGE 
Odds Ratio (std. error) 
More Access-Friendly Judge (higher 
score on scale) 1.12 (.045) 
More Access-Friendly Judge & 
Worker has representation 2.83 (.241) 
More Access-Friendly Judge & 
Worker is appellant .546 (.037) 
Wald Chi2 218.1 
Pseudo R2 0.04 
N 5086 
 This analysis shows that a worker with a judge who is more 
access-friendly is more likely to ultimately win her case (an odds ratio 
of 1.12 indicates that the presence of a more access-friendly judge 
increases the odds of a worker winning her case). The data also show 
that this increased likelihood of the worker winning her case is not the 
judge’s predisposition towards workers. This is both because, as 
discussed above, the pre-hearing access-friendliness scale is not a proxy 
for party preference and because using the same model as Table 5 with 
the party-specific access friendliness scale shows a weaker relationship 
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between party-specific access friendliness and the likelihood of the 
worker winning her case.88 
Table 5 also shows that representation for a worker increases the 
likelihood that a worker with an access-friendly judge will win her case 
(an odds ratio of 2.83 indicates that the presence of an access-friendlier 
judge and representation for the worker increases the odds—even 
more—that the worker will win her case). This is consistent with 
previously reported results about the role of representation in this 
data.89 Interestingly, Table 5 also shows that a worker who is the 
appellant is less likely to win her case with a pre-hearing access-
friendly judge (an odds ratio of .546 indicates that the presence of a 
more access-friendly judge and the worker as appellate decreases the 
odds that the worker will win her case). This is also consistent with 
previously reported results about overall case outcomes for appellant 
parties.90 
What do these results mean for pre-hearing procedural requests 
and judges? The data tell us a worker with an access-friendly judge is 
more likely to get in the hearing room, more likely to win her case and 
receive unemployment compensation, and thus more likely to 
experience the benefits that flow from that.91 The model also tells us 
that these advantages for workers are not party-related bias on the part 
of particular judges. To the contrary, this data may be showing relative 
fidelity to the law as written. This may be fidelity to written procedure 
that favors litigants getting in the hearing room or it may be fidelity to 
written substantive law that favors workers receiving unemployment 
compensation. It may also be fidelity to informal standards developed 
by the particular judge. 
 
 88. The odds ratio for a more party-specific-access friendly judge and a 
worker winning her case is 1.04 (.027). 
 89. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3 (finding that 
representation for workers increases the likelihood of the worker winning the case, and 
that representation for employer decreases the likelihood of the worker winning the 
case). 
 90. See id. (finding that worker as appellant decreases likelihood of worker 
winning the case).  
 91. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. 
SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 22 (2011), [https://perma.cc/BUT7-MHM5] 
(calculating that 3.2 million people would have fallen below poverty line in 2010 
without unemployment insurance benefits); Jonathan Cylus & Mauricio Avendano, 
Receiving Unemployment Benefits May Have Positive Effects on the Health of the 
Unemployed, 36 HEALTH AFF. 289 (2017) (discussing the “health-promoting effects” 
that come with receiving unemployment benefits). 
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Table 5 also reflects, like previous articles about this data and the 
work of others, that representation magnifies all of these advantages in 
the civil justice process.92 At its simplest, it may be that this aspect of 
the data is showing that access-friendly judges are operating within the 
system as the written law intends, and representation for a worker 
ensures that this is happening consistently.93 In a system where parties 
are all represented, representation is a way of monitoring and 
challenging judges who are less friendly toward procedural requests 
provided for by law or—viewed more broadly—who are not applying 
the law appropriately to the facts.94 A related insight from the data is 
that if there is no representation—as is the case for at least one party in 
the large majority of cases in this study—the interaction of judges and 
written law may produce different kinds of judicial behavior. This 
variation, and a greater understanding of the reasons for it, is a 
valuable focus for future research. 
The finding that a worker who is the appellant is less likely to win 
her case with a pre-hearing access-friendly judge may reveal an 
additional nuance to this concept of fidelity to procedures and access-
friendliness. It may be that there is a fairness concept embedded in 
access-friendliness that is rooted in written procedure (or at least 
general procedural norms). It may be that judges believe that the party 
who “started” a case should meet a higher standard to delay a case 
because it is unfair to drag another party into court and then make them 
wait to resolve the case. This is not necessarily an inappropriate 
perspective, but it should be a transparent and consistent one, rather 
than a matter of personal judicial approach or behavior. 
It may also be that the data reveal a gap in fidelity to the law, 
driven perhaps by human nature and perceptions of the adversarial 
system. While the written law does not give a “loss” in the agency 
proceeding any meaning or weight in the cases in this data, it may be 
that a judge is implicitly incorporating this information into decisions.95 
The data may be capturing a judge who sees an agency claims 
 
 92. Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise, supra note 3.  
 93. Rebecca L. Sandefur, When is Law in Action?, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
FURTHERMORE 59, 62–64 (2016), [https://perma.cc/4CJN-99M4]. 
 94. In an earlier article, my co-authors and I address a variation on this point: 
the absence of law reform arising from cases where parties are unrepresented because 
lawyers challenge the system in ways that self-represented parties, lay representatives, 
or lawyers providing less than full representation are not equipped to. Can a Little 
Representation Be a Dangerous Thing?, supra note 7. 
 95. This would be consistent with other studies of judicial behavior. See 
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 79, at 205, 216–18 (collecting studies regarding 
judicial consideration of inadmissible evidence). 
SHANAHAN – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2018 11:22 AM 
2018:215 The Keys to the Kingdom 245 
 
determination and does not formally receive it as evidence in a case, yet 
it informs the judge’s intermediate decisions—such as whether a 
document or witness is relevant—and the ultimate decision. In either 
circumstance, this finding about workers as appellants has particular 
salience for self-represented parties as both the concept of fairness and 
the implicit incorporation of agency determinations rest on assumptions 
that are far harder to see or overcome without representation. 
C. Implications 
The implications for this analysis rest on two premises that are 
unlikely to change: (1) the hearing room will remain the centerpiece of 
state civil and administrative courts and (2) parties in these courts will 
be overwhelmingly unrepresented. If these premises hold, then the 
analysis in this article suggests that we should invest in clarifying how 
we value access to the hearing room, and how we establish and make 
transparent written law and judicial behavior to implement that value. 
There has been plenty of focus on judicial behavior including 
judicial training, rules of judicial conduct, and judicial selection 
processes. The American Bar Association and many states have 
implemented judicial ethical reform focused on helping self-represented 
parties. As discussed above, the District of Columbia, the site of the 
data for this study, implemented among the most aggressive reforms in 
the country right before the data collection for this study. The 
qualitative research from this study—conducted two years after these 
reforms—suggests that judges were universally aware of their role as 
facilitators of access to justice, and yet varied widely in how they 
played this role in the hearing room.96 Despite these reforms, this 
article reveals similar variation in pre-hearing access-friendliness. Some 
scholars have suggested a more formalistic approach that shifts 
responsibility to the courts for procedural compliance.97 But do judges 
enforcing judges simply exacerbate the challenge? Again, the 
qualitative data from the larger study, of which this is a part, suggests 
that in the hearing room this approach yields inconsistent results.98 
A threshold question is: whether we value access to the hearing 
room enough to clarify and enforce that value in written law? Are there 
some parts of our written law where we do not need judicial discretion 
because we are clear about the value of access to the hearing room? 
 
 96. Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26, at 655–56. 
 97. Steinberg, supra note 8, at 795. 
 98. Active Judging and Access to Justice, supra note 26, at 656 (reporting 
inconsistency in hearing behaviors at OAH despite mandated peer review system). 
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The narrowest way to answer these questions in the affirmative is 
“automatic” access to a hearing. For example, court rules could 
provide that every litigant, regardless of the reason for the request, 
receives one automatic hearing continuance or telephone hearing. Or 
rules like the “good cause” standard in the data in this article could 
become more specific requirements, such as granting a new hearing 
date for a fever, but not for a routine dental cleaning. Some courts have 
versions of such rules already, with varying degrees of formality. We 
should study these formal and informal rules more. There are 
undoubtedly costs associated with docket management and court 
resources, as well as timeliness of decisions. But in some cases and 
courts—including the one that is the site of this study—those might be 
acceptable burdens in the pursuit of access to justice in a civil or 
administrative court system that is no longer a represented, adversarial 
process.99 
There are also broader implications to these findings. First, should 
we be considering this relationship between the value of access, pre-
hearing procedures, and judicial implementation in a systematic way? 
What if a state or local court undertook a comprehensive review of its 
pre-hearing procedures, identified where access to the hearing room is 
a key value, identified which procedures ostensibly exist to create 
access, and asked whether these laws could be rewritten to pursue this 
value more explicitly and directly, even if that meant reducing judicial 
discretion? Such an effort might yield unexpected results in terms of 
litigant satisfaction, use of court resources, and efficient system 
function. 
In an even broader sense, the findings in this article inform more 
ambitious redesign of justice systems. There are active movements—
arising largely out of technological advancements—to reconceive of 
justice systems.100 For example, technology developed by Modria, 
originally developed for Ebay’s lauded online dispute resolution 
system, was used to adjudicate divorces in the Netherlands and is now 
being redeveloped into a new form.101 The system gathers information 
from both parties and then recommends options for both representation 
and judge-based adjudication depending on the circumstances of the 
 
 99. This echoes a call in a different context for making the rules match the 
reality of pretrial circumstances. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil 
Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012). 
 100. See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 18. 
 101. The tool can be found at Rechtwijzer.nl. See Roger Smith, Goodbye, 
Rechtwijzer: Hello, Justice42, LAW, TECH. & ACCESS TO JUST. (Mar. 31, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/DHJ8-J26E]. 
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case.102 Essentially, the system has automated the access choices in the 
judicial system without explicitly constraining access. Of course, this 
brave new world of automating court processes implicates weighty 
questions balancing of certainty, efficiency, and individual justice that 
are beyond the scope of this article. Yet the findings of this article 
suggest that technological redesign and judicial reform efforts may 
come from different intellectual sources, but they end up asking the 
same question: are we implementing state civil and administrative 
justice systems consistent with how we value access to a substantive 
determination? The implication of this study that some access-focused 
procedures may be better suited to clearer standards, or even automatic 
and not judicially implemented decisions, informs these technological 
efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
This article examines the question of how judges apply pre-hearing 
procedures that control access to the hearing room. The data show 
significant variation in how judges apply the same procedure in the 
same types of cases, and that this variation is not explained by party 
bias or representation. This variation in judicial application of 
straightforward procedure outside the courtroom suggests that we need 
to know more about the role of pre-trial procedures in access to justice 
for self-represented litigants in state civil and administrative courts. 
This suggestion is compounded by the analysis—not demonstrating a 
causal relationship, but nonetheless underscoring the importance of 
getting in the courtroom—that a worker who gets a judge who is more 
likely to let her in the courtroom is more likely to win her case. 
These findings emphasize the importance of procedures and 
judicial decisions that grant or deny access to the courtroom for self-
represented litigants. They also underscore that changes to judicial 
behavior—through suggestion, training, or ethical codes—are likely 
insufficient to achieve access to justice in state civil and administrative 
courts. Though it may be in tension with the individualized decision 
making that comes from judicial discretion, access to justice reform in 
state civil and administrative courts may necessarily require a new 
approach to legal standards, procedures, and systems that more closely 
hew to the value of access to justice for self-represented litigants. 
 
 102. See id. 
